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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The police power is not static but progressive. It moves with
the movement of public opinion.3 9 The time has come when the
Courts should drop the mask of an exclusive concern for safety and
health and frankly approve reasonable regulation of the use of
property in the interests 40 of beauty.
ROSE L. LIPMAN.

NEGLIGENCE-MAINTENANCE

OF ELECTRIC WIRES.

One creating a possible danger is under a duty to take all possible
precautions to insure the safety of those who might be in the vicinity
engaged in an act which could be reasonably anticipated. Electricity of
high voltage is inherently dangerous. Very little knowledge of its qualities is possessed by the average layman. Within the past few decades
an increasing amount of litigation has arisen concerning electricity.
The carrying of electric current throtigh wires strung upon poles along
streets and highways has added to the danger of our already complex
life. Electrical companies, while not insurers of the absolute safety
of the public against all dangers arising from the lawful erection and
maintenance of their lines 1 are bound to exercise reasonable care in
the maintenance thereof. 2 While some states require a high degree
of care, the law in this State seems to be that "where potentiality of
injury from electric current exists, reasonable care requires only foresight apparently commensurate with the danger." 3
In a recent New York Court of Appeals case 4 the defendant
had acquired by deed a right of way across the grantor's property to
erect and to maintain high tension electric wires. The grantor's successor erected a railroad siding running diagonally under defendant's
wires. At the expense of the railroad the wires were raised to a
height of twenty-nine and one-half feet above the siding. Subsequently a contractor began to construct a roadway nearby. A movable crane with a boom forty feet in height was stationed near to or
at the crossing. It was used to lift materials from cars standing upon
the siding. All realized the danger of the boom forming a contact
with the wires. The defendant had notice. The contractor had
notice. The defendant did not refuse to erect higher poles but
insisted that the contractor pay for the change. The latter refused.
'Supra note 24.
10Ibid.
'W. U. Tel. Co. v. Thorn, 64 Fed. 287 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1894).
'Ibid.; N. Y. & N. J. Tel. Co. v. Bennett, 62 N. J. L. 742, 42 AtI. 759
(1899) ; JOYCE, ELECTRIC LAW (1900) §438.
3
Van Leet v. Kilmer, 252 N. Y. 454, 169 N. E. 644 (1930).
'Buell v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 259 N. Y. 443, 182 N. E. 77 (1932).

NOTES AND COMMENT
The intestate of the plaintiff was electrocuted while standing in a car
on the siding. The boom of the crane apparently had struck the
wire, transmitting an electric current of high voltage through the
body of the deceased.
The Appellate Division 5 reversed a judgment for the plaintiff
and dismissed the complaint upon the ground that the defendant by
the grant of the easement and the oral agreement as to how the easement was to be enjoyed, acquired a continuing right to maintain the
power line in the way that it was constructed. The employer of the
plaintiff's intestate became tenant of the land subject to the defendant's rights and was bound to adjust his use of the land to the defendant's use of its easement. The fault was the employer's when he
failed to do this. There was no duty on the defendant to raise the
wires. Without deciding the truth and exactness of this holding, I
think Taylor, J., in concurring, comes closer to the real issue to be
determined when he says:
"the work which Law Brothers did with this long crane
was not initially foreseeable by the defendant, whereby the
power wires should have been originally strung higher."
The Court of Appeals decided that the duty to avoid the danger
rested upon the contractor. The judgment of the Appellate Division
was affirmed. The electric company had no reason to anticipate that
the position of its wires would be a danger to anyone using the siding
or the adjoining property in the usual and customary way. The
danger arose when the contractor selected the crossing as the site to
unload his material. He should have made it safe by moving the cars
beyond the crossing, shifting his plant or arranging to have the wires
raised. He took none of these precautionary measures. He continued with his work. The Court very pointedly said:
"As the wires were reasonably safe for all usual and customary user of the siding or spur track, and were out of reach
of any apparent danger-apparent from ordinary use-the
company was not bound to move its wires because of some
extraordinary, special and temporary use being made of the
crossing by a contractor."
A review of the cases decided in the past, not only in this State
but also in other jurisdictions, reveals that a similar line of reasoning
was used in determining responsibility. 6 In Wagner v. Brooklyn
5Ibid.
'Braun v. Buffalo G. E. Co., 200 N. Y. 484, 490, 94 N. E. 206 (1911);
Adams v. Bullock, 227 N. Y. 208, 125 N. E. 93 (1919); Van Leet v. Kilmer,
supra note 3; Troidle v. Adirondack P. & L. Co., 252 N. Y. 483, 169 N. E. 654
(1930) ; Wagner v. Brooklyn Hts. R. R. Co., 69 App. Div. 349, 351, 74 N. Y.
Supp. 809 (2d Dept. 1902); Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 112 Ind. 404, 14
N. E. 391 (1887); Griffin v. United El. L. Co., 164 Mass. 492, 41 N. E. 675
(1895); McLaughlin v. Louisville El. L. Co., 100 Ky. 173, 37 S. W. 851
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Heights R. R. Co.,7 the defendant operated an elevated railroad. It
maintained a trolley feed wire carrying a powerful electric current.
The city was permitted to attach its police telegraph wires to the feed
wire. The plaintiff, a lineman of the police department, while repairing a broken telegraph wire, was injured by an electric shock which
was due to the fact that the insulation on the defendant's wire had
been worn away by contact with an iron brace. There was evidence
that the defendant could have discovered such defect by means of
instruments commonly used for that purpose. It was held that the
defendant was bound to exercise ordinary care to inspect its wires to
preserve the insulation from any impairment that would render them
dangerous to those rightfully brought into proximity thereto.
In Braun v. Buffalo General Electric Company8 an electric company, with permission, had strung two electric wires across a vacant
lot in a thickly settled part of the town. Subsequently building was
commenced upon the lot. While engaged in working upon the second
floor a carpenter raised the wires in order to pass to another part of
the floor. Upon grasping them he received a shock from which he
died. It was held error for the trial court to have dismissed the complaint. It was a question for the jury whether the company ought
not in the exercise of reasonable care and foresight to have apprehended that the lot might be so used as to bring people in contact with
the wires. To quote Hiscock, J.:
"While the convenience of electric and telephone. wires is
obvious and their maintenance should not be burdened with
excessive liabilities, still it seems clear that a company maintaining dangerous wires should not be relieved from the
affirmative duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to
maintain proper insulation and thereby prevent accidents reasonably to be apprehended to those lawfully coming in the
neighborhood of such wires."
In Adams v. Bullock 0 the defendant ran a trolley line which is
crossed by a bridge. The plaintiff, a boy of twelve, crossed the bridge
swinging a wire about eight feet long. This came into contact with
defendant's trolley wire which ran beneath the structure. The plaintiff was denied a recovery for the burns and shock suffered on the
ground that the defendant had adopted all reasonable precautions to
minimize peril. Only some extraordinary casualty, not fairly within
the area of ordinary prevision, could make it a thing of danger.
(1896) ; Fitzgerald v. Edison El. Ill. Co., 200 Pa. St. 540, 50 Atl. 161 (1901);
Daltry v. Media El. L., H. & P. Co., 208 Pa. St. 403, 57 At. 833 (1904);
Rowe v. Taylorville El. Co., 213 Ill. 318, 322, 72 N. E. 711, 713 (1904);
Connell v. Keokuk El. Ry. & P. Co., 131 Iowa 622, 109 N. W. 177 (1906);
Byerly v. Con. L., P. & I. Co., 130 Mo. App. 593, 109 S. W. 1065 (1908).
Wagner v. Brooklyn Hts. R. R. Co., ibid.
' Braun v. Buffalo G. E. Co., supra note 6.
'Adams v. Bullock, supra note 6.

NOTES AND COMMENT
In Troidle v. Adirondack P. & L. Corporation10 the plaintiff, in
order to erect a radio aerial wire, threw one end over the defendant's
wires, twenty feet above the ground, carrying a heavy voltage of
electricity. As the aerial came into contact with defendant's wires,
that part which remained on the ground uncoiled and struck plaintiff,
causing a current of electricity to pass through his body and to injure
him. The defendant was held to have owed no duty to the plaintiff
so to insulate his wires that in a perilous situation of plaintiff's own
creation, in which he voluntarily placed himself, he might suffer no
harm. Five judges concurred; Cardozo, Ch. J., concurred in result
on the ground that the defendant was not proved to have been negligent in that the insulation was not shown to be inadequate in view of
the contingencies reasonably to be foreseen.
And finally in the very recent case of Van Leet v. Kilmer 1 the
plaintiff's intestate, while standing upon a ladder placed against a
building, was fishing for a baffle plate inside a blower with an iron
rod. This rod came into contact with the defendant's low voltage
wires strung along the side of the building, shocking the deceased,
causing him to fall, from which he sustained a fractured skull and
died. The plaintiff was denied recovery since the defendant was not
bound to foresee and to make provision against such an accident.
So it will be seen that no liability for the creation of a dangerous
situation exists where it could not reasonably be foreseen that in the
ordinary course of events such situation would be fraught with danger
to anyone rightfully and customarily in the vicinity. Liability does
arise when there is a failure to provide the necessary safeguards
where the danger is reasonably to be anticipated.
HARRY BAUER SAM ES.

RIGHTS OF PARTIES TO A SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT.

The recent decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of the
Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Fairfield Gardens, Inc.," reversing the decision of the Appellate Division 2 has again caused much discussion
among attorneys concerning the policy of the Courts and the Legislature concerning building loan mortgages, the rights of prior and
subsequent lienors, and the rights of mortgagees who subordinate
their liens to such a building loan mortgage.
The ruling of the Court in the instant case is, that where a
mortgagee, at the instance of the owner of the property, agrees to
1

oTroidle v. Adirondack P. & L. Co., supra note 6.

"Supra note 3.
1260 N. Y. 16, 182 N. E. 231 (1932).
2235 App. Div. 768, 256 N. Y. Supp. 719 (1st Dept. 1932).

